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Background. Accelerated immunization schedules may help gain early control of inﬂuenza pandemics. We
investigated different schedules of an AS03A-adjuvanted H5N1 vaccine.
Methods. This phase II, open-label, 6-month study randomized participants (aged 18–64 years) to 2 vaccine
doses administered 21 (standard schedule), 14, or 7 days apart, or on the same day. Coprimary end points were
that the lower limit of the 98.75% conﬁdence interval 14 days after the last dose must be (1) .40% for
seroconversion rate (SCR) (Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research [CBER] criterion) and (2) .50% for
seroprotection rate (SPR) (attainment rate for reciprocal hemagglutination inhibition titers $40, protocol-
deﬁned criterion) for the vaccine homologous strain (A/Indonesia/5/2005). European Committee for Human
Medicinal Products (CHMP) immunogenicity criteria were also evaluated.
Results. Coprimary end points were achieved (lower 98.75% conﬁdence intervals exceeded deﬁned values).
Titers were highest with the standard schedule. Nevertheless, CBER SCR, protocol-deﬁned SPR, and CHMP criteria
were met with all schedules for the A/Indonesia/5/2005 strain. There were no signiﬁcant differences between age
groups (18–40 vs 41–64 years). Immune response was robust against drift variants A/turkey/Turkey/1/2005 and A/
Vietnam/1194/2004.
Conclusions. The AS03A-adjuvanted H5N1 vaccine in accelerated schedules offers a robust immune response
against vaccine homologous and drift variant strains, allowing consideration of compressed vaccination intervals.
Clinical Trials Registration. NCT00695669.
The avian H5N1 inﬂuenza virus remains a serious threat
to human health, and human cases continue to be re-
ported [1, 2]. The 2009 H1N1 inﬂuenza pandemic
illustrates that pandemics may arise rapidly with an
unexpected viral source. It is therefore essential to
continue diligent preparations to deal with potential
pandemic strain viruses, including H5N1.
Pandemic modelingdata suggestthat the peak disease
incidence could occur in the United Kingdom and
United States 50–85 days after the ﬁrst national case is
identiﬁed, assuming no intervention [3, 4]. In the 2009
H1N1 pandemic, the ﬁrst cases were reported in mid-
April 2009, and the World Health Organization an-
nounced Pandemic Alert Phase 6 on 11 June 2009. A
vaccine based on a matching pandemic strain is unlikely
to be produced quickly enough to immunize the re-
quired number of people to protect communities. An
alternative strategy is to vaccinate before the pandemic
occurs or when it is in its very early stages with a pre-
pandemic formulation containing antigens that are not
Received 25 August 2010; accepted 29 March 2011.
Potential conflicts of interest: A. M., F. R., P. L., and D. V. are employees of
GlaxoSmithKline Biologicals and report ownership of GlaxoSmithKline stock
options as part of a compensation package. All other authors: no conflicts.
Correspondence: Dennis A Reich, MD, Northern Ontario Medical School,
Medical Arts Bldg, 2009 Long Lake Rd, Ste 102, Sudbury, Ontario, P3E 6C3
(dr.reich@gmail.com).
The Journal of Infectious Diseases 2011;204:574–81
 The Author 2011. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the
Infectious Diseases Society of America. All rights reserved.
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
Commons Attribution Non-Commercial License (http://creativecommons.org/licen-
ses/by-nc/2.5), which permits unrestricted non-commercial use, distribution, and
reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
0022-1899 (print)/1537-6613 (online)/2011/2044-0014$14.00
DOI: 10.1093/infdis/jir328
574 d JID 2011:204 (15 August) d Lasko et alstrain matched to the actual pandemic virus [3]. Prepandemic
vaccines must induce a high and long-lasting cross-reactive
immune response so that the immune system is primed to
mount a rapid response to infection and/or to vaccination with
the strain-matched pandemic vaccine. In addition, it is impor-
tant that prepandemic and pandemic vaccines should be antigen
sparing, because production of enough vaccine to meet global
needs will rely on the availability of sufﬁcient quantities of the
prepandemic and pandemic virus antigen [5, 6].
PopulationsnaivetotheH5hemagglutinin(HA)antigenmay
respond poorly to vaccination, and it has been shown elsewhere
that up to 90 lg of HA antigen is needed to produce a satisfac-
tory immune response with conventional H5N1 vaccines [7].
The use of adjuvants has been highlighted as an important
strategy to gain antigen-sparing and improved immune re-
sponses in the development of pandemic and prepandemic
vaccines [5]. An H5N1 vaccine containing as little as 3.75 lgo f
HA, adjuvantedwithAS03A (a tocopherol oil-in-water emulsion
based adjuvant system), is licensed to be used in Europe in the
event of an imminent H5N1pandemic.Immunogenicity against
vaccine homologous strains and cross-reactivity have been
demonstrated in other studies, together with an acceptable re-
actogenicity and safety proﬁle [8–11]. Initial development of the
AS03A-adjuvanted vaccine was based on the A/Vietnam/1194/
2004 clade 1 strain, though the latest vaccines have used antigen
from more recent H5N1 drift variants, such as A/Indonesia/5/
2005 (clade 2.1) and A/turkey/Turkey/1/2005 (clade 2.2) [12].
Besides antigen-sparing and cross-reactive properties, pre-
pandemic vaccines should provide ﬂexibility in vaccination
schedules to offer more public health response options. To date,
most studies of prepandemic vaccines have used a 2-dose
schedule with a 21–28-day interval. Other studies have dem-
onstrated the immunogenicity of longer intervals using ho-
mologous and heteroclade antigen vaccine formulations [10].
However, modeling data suggest that rapid deployment of
a vaccine is an effective strategy to gain early control of a pan-
demic [4]. Therefore the ability to accelerate vaccination
schedules is advantageous. The purpose of the present study was
to evaluate immunogenicity of an AS03A-adjuvanted vaccine
using theA/Indonesia/5/2005strain,administered in accelerated
2-dose immunization schedules using intervals between doses of




The primary objectives of the study were to demonstrate that
the accelerated immunization schedules elicit an immune re-
sponse against the vaccine homologous strain (A/Indonesia/5/
2005) 14 days after the last vaccine dose of a 2-dose schedule
that meets or exceeds the following criteria: (1) US Food and
Drug Administration Center for Biologics Evaluation and
Research (CBER) criterion for seroconversion rate (SCR)
and (2) a protocol-deﬁned, potentially clinically meaningful
criterion for seroprotection rate (SPR) (attainment rate for
reciprocal hemagglutination inhibition [HI] titers $40).
Secondary objectives were to (1) demonstrate that the im-
mune response against the A/Indonesia/5/2005 strain meets the
CBER criterion for SCR, the protocol-deﬁned criterion for SPR
21 days after the last vaccine dose, and European Committee for
Human Medicinal Products (CHMP) criteria at 14 and 21 days
after the last vaccine dose; (2) describe the immune response
against the drift-variant strains, A/Vietnam/1194/2004 and
A/turkey/Turkey/1/2005, at 7, 14, and 21 days after the last
vaccine dose; (3) describe the kinetics of the immune response
between the ﬁrst and last vaccinations and up to 6 months after
the ﬁrst vaccine dose; and (4) describe the safety and re-
actogenicity of the vaccination schedules.
Study Design and Vaccine
This was a phase II, open-label, randomized, parallel-group,
6-month study conducted in 3 centers in Canada between June
and December 2008 (NCT00695669). Healthy male and non-
pregnant female participants aged 18–64 years were included in
the study. Exclusion criteria are shown in the supplementary
material. The study was conducted in accordance with the cur-
rent version of the Declaration of Helsinki and the International
Conference on Harmonisation Good Clinical Practice guide-
lines. The protocol was approved by the independent ethics
committee orinstitutionalreviewboardofeachstudycenter and
written informed consent was obtained from each participant.
The random allocation list was generatedbyGlaxoSmithKline
Biologicals.Investigatorsenrolledparticipants.Participantswere
randomized 1:1:1:1 and assigned to 1 of 4 study groups, ac-
cording to an Internet-based randomization blocking scheme.
The randomization algorithm used a minimization procedure
accounting for center and age (18–40 or 41–64 years). There
were 4 study groups, which received 2 vaccine doses: (1) 21 days
apart on days 0 and 21 (group 0/21); (2) 14 days apart on days
0and14(group0/14);(3) 7daysapartondays0and7(group0/
7); (4) 2 doses on day 0 (group 0/0). All participants attended
study visits at days 0, 21, 42, and 182. Additionally, visits were
scheduled at 7, 14, and 21 days after the last vaccine dose.
Telephone contact was made with all participants on day 51.
The H5N1-inactivated split-virion recombinant vaccine
(GlaxoSmithKline Biologicals) contained 15 lg/mL HA of the
A/Indonesia/5/2005 PR8-IBCDC-RG2 strain obtained from the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. When mixed 1:1
with AS03A, an oil-in-water emulsion-based adjuvant system
containing 11.86 mg DL-a-tocopherol [8, 9], each vaccine dose
(0.5 mL) provided 3.75 lg of HA. The vaccine was administered
into the deltoid region, the ﬁrst dose into the nondominant arm
and the last into the dominant arm.
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Blood samples were taken from all participants at each study
visit, and the following parameters were derived from HI titers:
(1) geometric mean titer (GMT), (2) SCR, (3) protocol-deﬁned
SPR, and (4) geometric mean fold rise (GMFR). The SCR was
deﬁned as the percentage of participants with either (1) a pre-
vaccination titer ,1:10 and a postvaccination titer $1:40 or
(2) a prevaccination titer $1:10 and a minimum 4-fold in-
crease in postvaccination titer. The SPR was deﬁned as the
percentage of participants who attained reciprocal HI titers of
$40. The GMFR was deﬁned as the geometric mean of the
within-subject ratios of the postvaccination-prevaccination
reciprocal HI titer.
Participants recorded solicited local and general adverse events
(AEs) in diary cards on the day of vaccination and for 6 days
afterward. They recorded unsolicited symptoms until the fol-
lowing visit. Investigatorsasked about AEsand seriousAEs(SAEs)
at each study visit and at the telephone contact on day 51. In
addition, abnormal laboratory ﬁndings were recorded as AEs or
SAEs if they met the deﬁnition. Deﬁnitions of SAEs and local and
general solicited AEs are provided in the supplementary material.
Statistics
A cutoff value for HI titers was deﬁned as 1:10. Seronegative
participants was deﬁned as those having an antibody titer below
the cutoff value; seropositive participants, those having a titer
greater than or equal to the cutoff value. Antibody titers below
the assay cutoff value were given an arbitrary value of 5 (half the
cutoff value) for the GMT calculation. A point estimate and the
associated 2-sided exact 98.75% conﬁdence interval (CI) were
calculated for the coprimary end points of SCR and protocol-
deﬁned SPR [13, 14]. A 2-sided exact 95% CI was used for the
secondary objective evaluation, calculated by the same method.
The exact 98.75% or 95% CI for a proportion within a group
was calculated with ProcStatXact software [13].
The immune response was evaluated according to CBER,
protocol-deﬁned, and CHMP criteria. The criteria to meet the
coprimary and secondary end points are described in Table 1.
For the coprimary end points, the lower limit of the 98.75% CI
for SCR had to be .40% (CBER criterion), and the lower limit
of the 98.75% CI for SPR had to be .50% (protocol-deﬁned
criterion). The primary immunogenicity analysis was based on
the according-to-protocol (ATP) cohort, which included all
participants who met eligibility criteria, complied with the
protocol, received 2 vaccine doses at the correct intervalfor their
assigned treatment regimen, and had a complete data set for the
coprimary end points. The safety analysis was based on the total
vaccinated cohort (TVC), which included all vaccinated par-
ticipants for whom safety data were available.
The overall study power was 81.5% to reach the coprimary
objectives in any of the vaccine groups. Assuming a 10%
dropout or unevaluable subject rate, a sample size of 78 par-
ticipants per group was required to reach 70 evaluable subjects
in each group to meet the study coprimary objectives with the
designed power.
RESULTS
Of the 312 participants who were enrolled and vaccinated, all
but 8 completed the study (Figure 1). The ATP cohort for the
immunogenicityanalysis consisted of283 participants(90.7% of
the TVC); reasons for exclusion are shown in Figure 1. De-
mographic characteristics were similar in each study group and
betweentheTVCandATPcohort;intheTVC,themeanagewas
40.3 years, 53.2% ofparticipantswere female, and 87.8%were of
white/European heritage. A total of 148 (47.4%) were in the
younger age stratum (18–40 years; mean age, 27.8 years), and
164 (52.6%) were in the older stratum (41–64 years; mean age,
51.7 years).
Table 1. Criteria for the Evaluation of Primary and Secondary End Points
Lower limit of CI,
a % CHMP, point estimates
End points CBER (SCR) Protocol deﬁned (SPR) SCR, % SPR, % GMFR
Coprimary end points
14 days after last dose
for A/Indonesia/5/2005
.40 .50 — — —
Secondary end points
21 days after last dose
for A/Indonesia/5/2005
.40 .50 .40 .70 .2.5
14 and 21 days after last dose
for A/Vietnam/1194/2004
and A/turkey/Turkey/1/2005
.40 .50 .40 .70 .2.5
NOTE. The seroconversion rate (SCR) was deﬁned as the percentage of participants with either a prevaccination titer ,1:10 and a postvaccination titer $1:40 or
a prevaccination titer $1:10 and a minimum 4-fold increase in postvaccination titer. The seroprotection rate (SPR) was deﬁned as the percentage of participants who
attainedreciprocalhemagglutinationinhibition(HI)titersof$40.Thegeometricmeanfoldrise(GMFR)wasdeﬁnedasthegeometricmeanofthewithin-subjectratioof
postvaccination/prevaccination reciprocal HI titers. CBER, Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research; CHMP: European Committee for Human Medicinal Products.
a For coprimary end points, 98.75% conﬁdence intervals (CIs) were used; for secondary end points, 95% CIs were used.
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Immune Response Against the Vaccine Homologous Strain in
All Participants. The study met its coprimary end points:
Both the CBER criterion for SCR and the protocol-deﬁned
criterion for SPR were achieved 14 days after the last vaccine
dose with all administration schedules (Tables 2 and 3). High
levels of SCR and SPR were achieved with all schedules 14 days
after the last vaccine dose, although rates were higher in groups
0/21 and 0/14 than in groups 0/7 and 0/0 (Tables 2 and 3).
Responses in group 0/14 were similar to those in group 0/21,
withpointestimateshigherforgroup0/21.Similarﬁndingswere
observed 21 days after the last vaccine dose (Tables 2 and 3),
although point estimates were somewhat higher in the 0/7 group
than in the 0/0 group. Although CIs overlapped, trends were for
peak antibody responses to occur 14 days after the last dose in
participants receiving the vaccine doses at 21- or 14-day intervals
versus peak responses occurring 21 days after the last dose in
those receivingthevaccine doses7daysapartoronthesame day.
The CHMP criteria for SCR and SPR were met with all
schedules at 14 and 21 days after the last vaccine dose (Tables 2
Figure 1. Disposition of participants. ATP, according-to-protocol cohort; TVC, total vaccinated cohort.
Table 2. Seroconversion Rate (SCR) 14 and 21 Days After Administration of the Last Vaccine Dose
SCR (95% CI)
a
Group and interval after last dose A/Indonesia/5/2005 A/Vietnam/1194/2004 A/turkey/Turkey/1/2005
14 days
Group 0/21 (n 5 65) 96.9 (86.9–99.8) (n 5 63) 76.9 (64.8–86.5) (n 5 50) 83.1 (71.7–91.2) (n 5 54)
Group 0/14 (n 5 69) 92.8 (81.2–98.3) (n 5 64) 59.4 (46.9–71.1) (n 5 41) 75.4 (63.5–84.9) (n 5 52)
Group 0/7 (n 5 74) 71.6 (56.8–83.7) (n 5 53) 33.8 (23.2–45.7) (n 5 25) 51.4 (39.4–63.1) (n 5 38)
Group 0/0 (n 5 75) 72.0 (57.3–83.9) (n 5 54) 33.3 (22.9–45.2) (n 5 25) 42.7 (31.3–54.6) (n 5 32)
21 days
Group 0/21 (n 5 62) 95.2 (86.5–99.0) (n 5 59) 66.1 (53.0–77.7) (n 5 41) 83.9 (72.3–92.0) (n 5 52)
Group 0/14 (n 5 69) 92.8 (83.9–97.6) (n 5 64) 49.3 (37.0–61.6) (n 5 34) 71.0 (58.8–81.3) (n 5 49)
Group 0/7 (n 5 72) 80.6 (69.5–88.9) (n 5 58) 26.4 (16.7–38.1) (n 5 19) 51.4 (39.3–63.3) (n 5 37)
Group 0/0 (n 5 74) 74.3 (62.8–83.8) (n 5 55) 31.1 (20.8–42.9) (n 5 23) 50.0 (38.1–61.9) (n 5 37)
NOTE. Data are presented for according-to-protocol cohort (participants aged 18–64 years). Vaccine doses were administered at intervals of 21 days (group 0/21),
14 days (group 0/14), or 7 days (group 0/7) or on the same day (group 0/0). The SCR was deﬁned as the percentage of participants with either a prevaccination titer
,1:10 and a postvaccination titer $1:40 or a prevaccination titer $1:10 and a minimum 4-fold increase in postvaccination titer; n 5 number of participants with data
available (stub column) or numbers of respondents (with SCR values).
a For the A/Indonesia/5/2005 strain at 14 days, 98.75% conﬁdence intervals (CIs) are shown; all other CIs are 95%.
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all schedules at both time points: Values were 119.4 (95% CI,
84.0–169.7), 65.0 (45.6–92.5), 14.2 (10.0–20.1), and 11.6
(8.0–16.7) for groups 0/21, 0/14, 0/7, and 0/0, respectively,
14 days after the last dose. Compared with the results at 14
days after the second dose, GMFR values at 21 days after the
last dose were slightly lower in groups 0/21 and 0/14 but
slightly higher in groups 0/7 and 0/0: 97.3 (95% CI, 67.1–
141.2), 57.6 (41.3–80.3), 18.1 (12.8–25.8), and 13.5 (9.2–
19.6), respectively.
GMTs were highest in group 0/21, followed by group 0/14;
they were lower in groups 0/7 and 0/0 (Figure 2, A–C). All
groups exhibited an increase in titers after each dose, with
a larger increase after the last dose. The antibody response
was sustained at 6 months after vaccination, although anti-
body titers declined compared with earlier values (data
shown in supplementary material). At 6 months, the CBER
criterion for SCR was achieved in groups 0/21, 0/14, and
0/0, and the protocol-deﬁned criterion for SPR was achieved
in groups 0/21 and 0/14 (data shown in supplementary
material).
Immune Response Against the Vaccine Homologous Strain
According to Age. As with the overall analysis, the immune
response within each age group (18–40 and 41–64 years) was
higher in groups 0/21 and 0/14 than in groups 0/7 and 0/0
(Figure 3a and b). Values for SCR, SPR, and GMT did not differ
greatly by age. However, GMTs in the 0/21 group were some-
what higher in younger participants (age, 18–40 years) than
older participants (age, 41–64 years), and a similar pattern was
observed in the 0/14 group.
Immune Response Against Drift-Variant Strains. The
immune response against the drift variants was relatively ro-
bust, although, as expected, lower than against the vaccine
homologous strain (Tables 2 and 3). The immune response
against the clade 2 A/turkey/Turkey/1/2005 strain was greater
than against the clade 1 A/Vietnam/1194/2004 strain.
The CBER criterion for SCR was reached for both strains in
group 0/21 and 0/14 at 14 days after the last vaccine dose,
although this was not the case for the A/Vietnam/1194/2004
strain in group 0/14 at 21 days after the last dose (Table 2). The
protocol-deﬁned criterion for SPR was achieved in group 0/21
for both strains at both time points. For group 0/14, it was
achieved for the A/turkey/Turkey/1/2005 strain at both time
points (Table 3).
The CHMP criterion for SCR was met with all vaccination
schedules for the A/turkey/Turkey/1/2005 strain and in groups
0/21 and 0/14 for the A/Vietnam/1194/2004 strain at both time
points (Table 2). For SPR, the CHMP criterion was met at 14
days after the last dose in groups 0/21 and 0/14 for the A/turkey/
Turkey/1/2005 strain and in group 0/21 for the A/Vietnam/
1194/2004 strain (Table 3). However, at 21 days after the last
dose, only the A/turkey/Turkey/1/2005 strain met the CHMP
criterion for SPR in groups 0/21 and 0/14 (Table 3).
Safety Analysis
There were no clinically relevant differences between study
groups in the reactogenicity or general safety proﬁle of the
vaccine (data shown in supplementary material). A total of 8
SAEs were reported by 5 participants: 1 participant reported
exacerbated irritable bowel syndrome (group 0/21); 1 died as
a result of injury (group 0/7); 1 experienced syncope (group
0/7); 1 experienced exacerbated diabetes mellitus, myocardial
infarction, cellulitis, and congestive heart failure, and was
withdrawn from the study (group 0/7); and 1 experienced
phlebitis (group 0/0). All SAEs were considered unrelated to the
vaccine by the investigators.
Table 3. Seroprotection Rate (SPR) 14 and 21 Days After Administration of the Last Vaccine Dose
SPR (95% CI)
a
Group and interval after last dose A/Indonesia/5/2005 A/Vietnam/1194/2004 A/turkey/Turkey/1/2005
14 days
Group 0/21 (n 5 65) 96.9 (86.9–99.8) (n 5 63) 78.5 (66.5–87.7) (n 5 51) 92.3 (83.0–97.5) (n 5 60)
Group 0/14 (n 5 69) 92.8 (81.2–98.3) (n 5 64) 59.4 (46.9–71.1) (n 5 41) 82.6 (71.6–90.7) (n 5 57)
Group 0/7 (n 5 74) 74.3 (59.7–85.9) (n 5 55) 35.1 (24.4–47.1) (n 5 26) 58.1 (46.1–69.5) (n 5 43)
Group 0/0 (n 5 75) 74.7 (60.2–86.1) (n 5 56) 37.3 (26.4–49.3) (n 5 28) 52.0 (40.2–63.7) (n 5 39)
21 days
Group 0/21 (n 5 62) 95.2 (86.5–99.0) (n 5 59) 67.7 (54.7–79.1) (n 5 42) 93.5 (84.3–98.2) (n 5 58)
Group 0/14 (n 5 69) 92.8 (83.9–97.6) (n 5 64) 49.3 (37.0–61.6) (n 5 34) 79.7 (68.3–88.4) (n 5 55)
Group 0/7 (n 5 72) 81.9 (71.1–90.0) (n 5 59) 30.6 (20.2–42.5) (n 5 22) 61.1 (48.9–72.4) (n 5 44)
Group 0/0 (n 5 74) 77.0 (65.8–86.0) (n 5 57) 36.5 (25.6–48.5) (n 5 27) 58.1 (46.1–69.5) (n 5 43)
NOTE. Data are presented for according-to-protocol cohort (participants aged 18–64 years). Vaccine doses were administered at intervals of 21 days (group 0/21),
14 days (group 0/14), or 7 days (group 0/7) or on the same day (group 0/0). The SPR was deﬁned as the attainment rate for reciprocal hemagglutination inhibition
titers $40; n 5 number of participants with data available (stub column) or numbers of respondents (with SPR values).
a For the A/Indonesia/5/2005 strain at 14 days, 98.75% conﬁdence intervals (CIs) are shown; all other CIs are 95%.
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The study showed that the AS03A-adjuvanted vaccine produced
a robust immune response with all the accelerated schedules
evaluated. The study met its primary end point, with the vaccine
eliciting an immune response against the vaccine homologous
strain withall schedules at 14daysafter the lastvaccine dose that
exceeded the CBER criterion for SCR and a protocol-deﬁned
criterion for SPR that was considered potentially clinically
meaningful.
Mathematical modeling studies have suggested that a stock-
piled vaccine not strain matched to the pandemic virus may
nevertheless have a considerable impact on containing the
pandemic [3, 15], because protection could develop not only
Figure 2. Hemagglutination inhibition geometric mean titers (GMTs)
against (A) A/Indonesia/5/2005 H5N1, (B) A/Vietnam/1194/2004 H5N1,
and (C) A/turkey/Turkey/1/2005 H5N1 at day 0 through 42. Data are
presented for the according-to-protocol cohort (participants aged 18–64
years). Vaccine doses were administered at intervals of 21 days (group
0/21), 14 days (group 0/14), or 7 days (group 0/7) or on the same day
(group 0/0). CI, confidence interval.
Figure 3. Hemagglutination inhibition geometric mean titers (GMTs)
against A/Indonesia/5/2005 H5N1 at day 0 through 42 according to age:
(A) 18–40 years vs (B) 41–64 years. Data are presented for according-
to-protocol cohort. Vaccine doses were administered at intervals of 21
days (group 0/21), 14 days (group 0/14), or 7 days (group 0/7) or on the
same day (group 0/0). CI, confidence interval.
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strains. Another model has predicted that vaccinating a certain
number of people with 1 dose is more effective at mitigating
a pandemic than providing maximal protection with 2 vaccine
doses to half that number [4]. Some schedule ﬂexibility may
help to ease the inevitable logistic pressures associated with
delivering a pandemic or prepandemic vaccination program [5].
In particular, vaccination with only 1 dose will simplify pro-
grams [16]. The H1N1 pandemic has shown that a pandemic
can indeed arise very rapidly from an unexpected source. Timely
actions are needed to contain a pandemic, and vaccination
strategies that prioritize rapid mass immunization are crucial
from a public health perspective.
Licensing authority criteria are based on threshold levels of
immune response that are likely to offer protection against in-
fection to individuals. However, it could be important that
health authorities also consider vaccination strategies that may
offer less than maximal protection to individuals but provide
greater beneﬁts to the population as a whole because they help
contain the pandemic. It was in this context that we developed
the protocol-deﬁned criterion specifying that the lower limit of
the CI for SPR had to be .50%. Although there is no known
correlate of protection for H5N1, we assumed that potentially
useful clinical protection would be achieved if the lower limit of
the SPR exceeded 50%. This assumption was based on modeling
results predicting that a vaccine that achieved 30% efﬁcacy
against viral susceptibility and 50% efﬁcacy against in-
fectiousness may be a useful part of a pandemic containment
strategy [15]. Thus, attaining a titer potentially able to modify
susceptibility or transmission in 50% of participants within 2
weeks of completing immunization seemed a reasonable goal.
The referenceschedulewitha21-dayintervalbetweentheﬁrst
and last vaccine doses produced the highest immune response
against the vaccine homologous strain, followed by the schedule
with a 14-day interval. The response was less for the schedules
with shorter intervals (7-day interval and same-day adminis-
tration), but these schedules nevertheless produced an adequate
immune response based on CBER SCR, protocol-deﬁned SPR,
and CHMP(SCR,SPR,and GMFR) criteria14days afterthelast
dose. Values with the 21- and 14-day schedules tended to be
higher in younger participants (18–40 years) than in older
participants(41–64years),butthere were norelevantdifferences
between the immune responses of younger versus older adults.
The vaccine has also been evaluated in the elderly ($61 years)
and can be given at the same dose and schedule as in younger
adults (3.75-lg doses given 21 days apart) [17]. Recent studies
suggest a negative impact of prior seasonal inﬂuenza vaccination
on seroresponses to H5N1 vaccines [18]. However, we did not
evaluateanypotentialeffectofseasonalvaccinationinthisstudy.
Antibodies persisted above baseline levels 6 months after
vaccine administration; although levels had declined compared
withearlier in thestudy, CBER and CHMPcriteriafor SCR were
met with the 21-day, 14-day, and same-day schedules. Never-
theless, the study was not powered to detect differences between
the different schedules in terms of the magnitude of response at
6 months.
Previous studies have shown that the AS03A-adjuvanted
H5N1 vaccine produces a cross-reactive immune response to
drift variant strains [8–10]. The immune response against the
drift variant strains, A/Vietnam/1194/2004 and A/turkey/Tur-
key/1/2005, was robust, particularly against the A/turkey/Tur-
key/1/2005 strain,which isgenetically more closely related tothe
vaccine homologous strain. As with the vaccine homologous
strain, the responsewashigherwiththe 21-and 14-dayintervals.
Nevertheless, some level of response was observed with all
schedules, with CBER, protocol-deﬁned, and CHMP criteria
being met in several cases.
The observed peak immune response occurred consistently at
14 days after the last vaccine dose with the 21- and 14-day
schedules, regardless of strain or age. However, no clear peak
was observed with the 7-day and same-day schedules, although
the trend was for the peak response to occur at 21 days after the
second vaccine dose. This suggests that reducing the interval
between vaccinations not only induces lower immune responses
but also generates a slower increase in the response.
As mentioned elsewhere, a mathematical model has predicted
thatvaccinatingacertain numberofpeoplewith1 doseprovides
more effective pandemic mitigation than vaccinating half that
numberwith2doses[4].Inourstudy,GMTsagainstthevaccine
homologous strain in the 21-day interval group were 40.2 at 21
days after a single vaccine dose, compared with 640.0 at 14 days
after the second dose. Similarly, in the 14-day interval group,
GMTs were 26.8 at 14 days after a single dose, compared with
345.0 at 14 days after the second dose. The same pattern was
seen in the 7-day interval group: 7.6 at 7 days after a single dose
compared with 77.7 at 14 days after the second dose. Thus,
a relatively low immune response was observed after a single
dose, and therefore the effect on pandemic mitigation after only
1 dose of H5N1 vaccine is uncertain.
The safety proﬁle of the vaccine was acceptable and there
appeared to be no impact of administration schedule on its
reactogenicity proﬁle. Reactogenicity was no more severe when
the vaccine was administered twice on the same day compared
with the other schedules.
In conclusion, the present study shows that the vaccine given
in an accelerated schedule elicits a potent immune response
against the vaccine homologous strain, offers a rapid immune
response evident after only 1 double dose, and elicits a cross-
reactive response against drift variant strains. This proﬁle may
provide ﬂexibility for health authorities to consider more tem-
porally compressed dosing schedules with an antigen-sparing
vaccine in the event of an emergency H5N1 outbreak. The data
presented suggest that such shortened regimens could be im-
plemented.
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